Thursday, November 20, 2008

Statute of Limitations Against Your Underinsured Motorist Coverage

This issue covers those circumstances when you know the defendant insurance coverage will not be adequate to cover the extent of the injury you have sustained. This can happen when the defendant has no insurance or the insurance they have is not enough to compensate your damages. So the issue sometimes arises as to when do you have to file suit against your own insurance company or more accurately the insurance company covering the vehicle you were in at the time of the accident. Some people argue the time frame starts when you are injured. However in Maryland personal injury cases the suit against the UM carrier is a claim in breach of contract. As such according to Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990), the court determined the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run on a suit by the insured against the insurer for the breach of the contractual duty to indemnify until that breach literally occurs.

In the Lane case husband and wife were involved in an automobile accident that was the apparent fault of an uninsured motorist. They notified their insurance company of the accident shortly after it happened. On December 14, 1982, they brought suit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company, however, made no effort to intervene. On April 17, 1986, over three years later, the Lanes sued their insurance company for uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations. The Court of Appeals held the Statute of Limitations cannot begin running until there is an actual breach of the contract.

Monday, November 3, 2008

Maryland Medical Malpractice the Twenty Percent Rule

Maryland medical malpractice law places a limitation on who can testify in the cases to certify and/or testify to the standard of care to those medical providers who devote no more then 20% of their professional time to testifying in personal injury cases. Specifically, MD Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-2A-04 b(4)

A health care provider who attests in a certificate of a qualified expert or who testifies in relation to a proceeding before an arbitration panel or a court concerning compliance with or departure from standards of care may not devote annually more than 20 percent of the expert's professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims.

The issue was addressed in in Witte v. Azarian where the court addressed what kind of activities “directly involve testimony in personal injury claims,” within the meaning of CJ section 3-2A-04(b)(4), so as to constitute the numerator in the 20 Percent Rule. The court reasoned that the operative statutory phrase at issue (“activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims”), was ambiguous, as its meaning could not be ascertained from its plain language, and that, in light of the legislative history of the Act as amended, including the amendments establishing the certificate of qualified expert requirement, that language had to be read narrowly, so as to avoid “creat[ing] an unreasonable impediment to the pursuit, or defense, of a common law right of action” for medical negligence. The Court determined a standard to determine the issue as follows:

A more reasonable approach, we think, is to regard the statute as including only (1) the time the doctor spends in, or traveling to or from, court or deposition for the purpose of testifying, waiting to testify, or observing events in preparation for testifying, (2) the time spent assisting an attorney or other member of a litigation team in developing or responding to interrogatories and other forms of discovery, (3) the time spent in reviewing notes and other materials, preparing reports, and conferring with attorneys, insurance adjusters, other members of a litigation team, the patient, or others after being informed that the doctor will likely be called upon to sign an affidavit or otherwise testify, and (4) the time spent on any similar activity that has a clear and direct relationship to testimony to be given by the doctor or the doctor's preparation to give testimony.